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In this article, we consider the usefulness of functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) 
1 
2 and perturbation in evaluating causal relationships between bodily self-consciousness and the 
3 
4 
5 brain. We argue that fMRI research is not always restricted to correlational statements   when 
6 
7 it is combined with perturbation techniques and can sometimes permit some degree of  causal 
8 
9 
inferencing, such as when bodily illusions are examined with fMRI. In these instances, one is 
11 
12 changing a participant’s conscious bodily self by experimentally perturbing mechanisms  that 
13 
14 
are involved in multisensory integration. 
16 
17 
18 
19 
Keywords:   Functional   magnetic  resonance  imaging  (fMRI),  bodily    self-consciousness, 
20 
21 
22 multisensory integration, perturb-and-measure. 
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Introduction 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 We are quite  familiar  and attuned to  our  conscious bodily self  and have a strong   personal 
6 
7 attachment to it. Yet, paradoxically, this phenomenology remains ineffable and mysterious. 
8 
9 
The relationships between the contents of this conscious experience and the levels of  activity 
11 
12 in different brain regions can be characterised by fMRI. However, it is often difficult to  infer 
13 
14 
the true nature of these activations. This is because fMRI is a measurement technique and    is 
16 
17 therefore  inherently  correlative  and  not  immune  to  epiphenomenal  results.  For example, 
18 
19 
activation in the visual cortex while we are awake relative to while we are asleep might be 
20 
21 
22 epiphenomenal  to  wakefulness.  Wakefulness  might  not  be  the  primary  cause  for      the 
23 
24 activation. Rather, the opening of the eyelids allowing for retinal information to reach the 
25 
26 
27 brain for further cortical processing may be the primary cause for this activation. Thus, it  can 
28 
29 be  difficult  to  establish  causation  with  fMRI.  Considering  this  limitation,  the following 
30 
31 
question   arises:   How   useful   is   this   technique   for   investigating   different   facets   of 
33 
34 consciousness? In this article, we argue that there are instances in which fMRI allows some 
35 
36 
degree of evaluation of causation when the effects of perturbation are examined, such as   the 
37 
38 
39 induction of bodily illusions on brain activation. 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 Can one really evaluate causation? 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
Evaluations of causality can be achieved to some degree with fMRI through experimental 
manipulation using perturbation techniques. For example, as illustrated in Fig. 1A, if a  given 
visual stimulus ‘activates’ region X, we do not know whether its activation is due to the 
stimulus  or  some  other  cause  such  as  reciting  Shakespeare  or  thinking  about breakfast. 
However,  as  illustrated  in  Fig  1B,  if  one  perturbs  region  X  from  processing  the visual 
4 
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experimentally altered to create different states of consciousness (e.g. having the sense of 
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1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 remains activated then its activation does not have something to do with the stimulus. 
8 
9 
The  notion  of  a  perturb  and  measure  approach  for  inferring  causality  in   brain- 
11 
12 behaviour relationships is nothing new in cognitive neuroscience and it has a long history 
13 
14 
(Paus,  2005).  For  example,  in  some  of  the  most  famous  experiments  in  cognitive 
16 
17 neuroscience, perturbation by brain lesions informed us that the left inferior frontal cortex   is 
18 
19 
essential for language production (Broca, 1861) and the hippocampus for declarative memory 
20 
21 
22 (Scoville & Milner, 1957). Similarly, the somatotopic organization of the motor cortex was 
23 
24 first demonstrated in humans by electrical stimulation applied along the precentral cortex    in 
25 
26 
27 neurological patients during surgery (Penfield & Boldrey, 1937). Today, similar   approaches 
28 
29 based  on  less  invasive  methods  (e.g.  transcranial  magnetic  stimulation)  are  used  in 
30 
31 
combination with functional neuroimaging techniques such as fMRI (Paus, 2005). 
33 
34 The primary focus of this article is to highlight how different kinds of perturbation 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
stimulus (e.g. asking the participant to close their eyes) and then repeat the experiment again, 
we can more confidently say something about causation. If region X is no longer activated 
then its activation is more likely to have something to do with the stimulus. If region X 
techniques can change bodily consciousness and consequently brain activity as measured 
with fMRI, which in turn allow certain inferences to be made about causality. In its   simplest 
form, as shown in Fig. 1C, if the loss of consciousness due to an experimental manipulation 
causes activation in region X to cease, then its activation is more likely to have something  to 
do  with  consciousness.  If  region  X  remains  activated  then  its  activation  does  not  have 
something to  do  with  consciousness.  Note  the  latter  is  quite  possible  as  evidenced by a 
number of studies demonstrating fMRI activation to a passive listening task in comatose 
patients (Coleman et al., 2009) and healthy participants sedated with general anaesthesia 
(Davis et al., 2007). In a more complicated form, as shown in Fig. 1D, if consciousness is 
5 
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bodily  self  inside  versus  outside  the  physical  body)  and  activation  in  region  X  is 
1 
2 parametrically modulated  in  the  same  manner,  then  its  activation  is  more  likely to have 
3 
4 
5 something to with this consciousness. Otherwise, it does not. 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 The perturbation and imaging of resting states 
11 
12 
13 
14 
Neuroimaging  research  has  revealed  that  two  distinct  brain  networks,  the  default  mode 
16 
17 (DMN) and executive-control (ECN) networks, are associated with general states of mental 
18 
19 
rest and task related cognition, respectively (Fox et al., 2005). Research using fMRI has been 
20 
21 
22 useful in describing how these networks operate. For instance, Fox et al. (2005) examined the 
23 
24 relationship  between  DMN  and  ECN  during  spontaneous  fluctuations  in  fMRI    BOLD 
25 
26 
27 activity. In this experiment, participants underwent fMRI during different resting  conditions: 
28 
29 eyes closed, eyes open in low light, and fixation of a visual crosshair. Six predefined  regions 
30 
31 
of interest were examined for resting state correlations in brain areas pertaining to the   DMN 
33 
34 and ECN. The correlational coefficients between the regions of interest and the time course 
35 
36 
were then computed for each participant. An important finding was that the DMN and ECN 
37 
38 
39 were anti-correlated in the absence of any overt task. 
40 
41 ECN and DMN research have demonstrated clear implications for how we understand 
42 
43 
44 consciousness to be functionally related to brain activity. Firstly, the phenomenon of mind 
45 
46 wandering, when attention drifts from a current train of thought to content generated by the 
47 
48 
individual, is a fundamental aspect of consciousness that appears to have a neural basis.   The 
50 
51 oscillations between DMN and ECN have indeed been found to coincide with reports of mind 
52 
53 
wondering (Smallwood & Schooler, 2015). Secondly, the phenomena of social reflection 
54 
55 
56 (Schilbach, Eickhoff, Rotarska-Jagiela, Fink, & Vogeley, 2008) and self-recollection (Spreng 
57 
58 &  Grady,  2010)  both  show  similar  oscillations  between  DMN  and  ECN.  These studies 
6 
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highlight an important strength of fMRI in that global activity can be assessed throughout the 
1 
2 brain and that the contents of different conscious states can be inferred. However, causality 
3 
4 
5 can be drawn from these studies only when these networks are perturbed using methods  such 
6 
7 as anaesthesia in conjunction with fMRI. To demonstrate this, an fMRI study by (Schrouff  et 
8 
9 
al., 2011) aimed to investigate how the function and connectivity of brain networks were 
11 
12 implicated   in   conscious   states   after   being   affected   by   varying   levels   of    induced 
13 
14 
unconsciousness   by   the   administration   of   propofol.   Their   results   demonstrated  that 
16 
17 synchronous activity, both between and within brain networks, reduced accordingly as the 
18 
19 
level of consciousness was decreased. 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 FMRI and illusions of ownership for body parts 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 Bodily self-consciousness pertains to the experience of owning a physical body and having  a 
30 
31 
first person perspective from that body. One can experimentally perturb this experience by 
33 
34 providing conflicting information from the different senses, resulting in powerful illusions  of 
35 
36 
where the self is located relative to the physical body. It is important to underscore the 
37 
38 
39 perturbation aspect  of  these illusions,  which relies  on mechanisms that  would normally be 
40 
41 helpful for bodily self-consciousness but tricks us into experiencing a disturbance when we 
42 
43 
44 are presented with conflicting information from the different senses, which is something  that 
45 
46 ordinarily does not occur under normal circumstances. 
47 
48 
For instance, in the rubber-hand illusion (Botvinick & Cohen, 1998), the participant 
50 
51 watches a rubber hand being stroked with a brush while they feel their own hand, which is 
52 
53 
hidden from view, being stroked in synchrony with the rubber hand. When this procedure   is 
54 
55 
56 done properly, the participant quickly begins to experience a transfer of ownership from their 
57 
58 own hand to the rubber hand. FMRI studies have demonstrated how activity in a number of 
7 
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multisensory brain areas, such as the posterior parietal cortex and the ventral premotor   area, 
1 
2 is modulated during the rubber-hand illusion, highlighting the role played by these areas in 
3 
4 
5 integrating visuo-tactile signals necessary for the self-attribution of a hand (Ehrsson, Holmes, 
6 
7 & Passingham, 2005; Ehrsson, Spence, & Passingham, 2004; Gentile, Guterstam, Brozzoli, & 
8 
9 
Ehrsson, 2013). When multisensory signal are perturbed, self-attribution of a hand    transfers 
11 
12 from the real hand to an artificial hand, which suggests a causal link between processing in 
13 
14 
these brain areas and ownership. 
16 
17 
18 
19 
FMRI and out-of-body experiences 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 In the next two sections, we will discuss how experimentally-induced disturbances of   bodily 
25 
26 
27 self-consciousness  can  be  extended  to  the  whole  body and  how  fMRI  has  been  used to 
28 
29 examine  their  neural  underpinnings.  Out-of-body  experiences  are  illusory      experiences 
30 
31 
characterised  by three phenomenological features: i) disembodiment, i.e. the impression    of 
33 
34 being 'teleported' outside of a body to another location in space; ii) the impression of seeing 
35 
36 
the world from a different visuo-spatial perspective; and iii) the impression of seeing a   body 
37 
38 
39 from this new perspective (Bunning & Blanke, 2005). This phenomenon is can be observed 
40 
41 in some patients with neurological (Blanke, Landis, Spinelli, & Seeck, 2004) and  psychiatric 
42 
43 
44 (Simeon, 2004) conditions as well as drug abuse (Wilkins, Girard, & Cheyne, 2012). 
45 
46 Ehrsson (2007) demonstrated that it is possible to experimentally generate an   out-of- 
47 
48 
body  experience  in  healthy participants  in  a  systematic  manner  using  virtual  reality and 
50 
51 tactile stimulation (Fig. 2). In this study, participants sat on a chair and wore a pair of head- 
52 
53 
mounted displays. Video cameras were used to show the participants' back with a perspective 
54 
55 
56 of a person sitting 2 m behind them. The experimenter touched the participant's actual chest 
57 
58 (not visible) with a rod as well as an 'illusory' chest right below the recording cameras with  a 
8 
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second rod (visible). Participants reported an out-of-body experience of sitting behind their 
1 
2 own  body  and  seeing  themselves  from  a  third-person  perspective,  as  revealed  by  their 
3 
4 
5 responses to a questionnaire. These out-of-body experiences were also measured in a more 
6 
7 objective  manner  using  skin  conductance  response  as  an  indicator  of  arousal  in another 
8 
9 
experimental condition in which the illusory chest was 'hurt' by hitting it with a hammer. In 
11 
12 agreement  with  the  perceptual  experience,  the  physiological  response  also  indicated that 
13 
14 
participants   were   experiencing   themselves   as   being   located   behind   their   real body. 
16 
17 Importantly,  both  perceptual  ratings  and  skin  conductance  responses  were  weaker under 
18 
19 asynchronous conditions, whereby the participant’s actual and illusory chests were touched in 
20 
21 
22 alternation, suggesting that this phenomenon requires congruent visuo-proprioceptive  signals 
23 
24 for successful visuo-tactile integrations. 
25 
26 
27 In a similar manner, Lenggenhager, Tadi, Metzinger, & Blanke (2007) used visuo- 
28 
29 tactile stimulation to systematically induce disturbances in bodily self-consciousness (Fig. 2). 
30 
31 
Participants wore head-mounted display goggles while they stood inside a room. With the 
33 
34 goggles, the participants viewed their backs being stroked with a brush from a different visual 
35 
36 
perspective. This perspective was filmed using a closed-circuit television camera directly 
37 
38 
39 behind them. The key manipulation was whether the strokes they saw were synchronous or 
40 
41 asynchronous to what was actually delivered to their backs. When the two were synchronous, 
42 
43 
44 participants reported a feeling of their self moving forwards to their virtual body they saw 
45 
46 through the head-mounted display goggles. This was measured by questionnaires and by   the 
47 
48 
experimenter  physically  displacing  the  participant  to  a  new  location  after  each  trial and 
50 
51 asking the participant to return to their original starting position. The participants tended to 
52 
53 
return to a position that was in front of their original starting position in the synchronous   but 
54 
55 
56 not asynchronous stroking conditions. 
57 
58 
9 
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In  an  fMRI  study,  Ionta  et  al.  (2011)  repeated  similar  procedures  but  with   the 
1 
2 participant laying down in the MRI scanner. For tactile stimulation, a brush was embedded 
3 
4 
5 inside the bed of the scanner which could be remotely controlled to move up and down along 
6 
7 the  participant’s  back  and  stroke  it  with  precision  timing.  For  visual  stimulation,     the 
8 
9 
participant wore head-mounted display goggles and watched a video of somebody else’s back 
11 
12 being brushed. The videos were filmed with a camera behind this person. Again, the key 
13 
14 
manipulation was whether the strokes applied to the participant’s back were synchronous    or 
16 
17 asynchronous to what they saw on the video. 
18 
19 
Under  the  synchronous  brush  stroke  condition,  two  thirds  of  the        participants 
20 
21 
22 experienced seeing a virtual body above them and feeling their self moving upwards while 
23 
24 the remaining participants experienced seeing a virtual body below them and feeling their self 
25 
26 
27 moving downwards. The authors suggested that these discrepancies arose from individual 
28 
29 differences in how vestibular and visual cues are weighted for the purposes of creating a 
30 
31 
perception of the  spatial  orientation of  the self.  Specifically, the  participants relying   more 
33 
34 heavily on vestibular cues took a perspective from a supine position, which is the same 
35 
36 
position they were in as they laid on the bed the scanner. In contrast, the participants   relying 
37 
38 
39 more  heavily  on  visual  cues  took  a  perspective  from  a  prone  position,  which  was     a 
40 
41 perspective  that  was  perhaps  suggestive  from  the  videos.  These  differences  in   illusory 
42 
43 
44 experiences of the self were confirmed by having participants perform a mental ball dropping 
45 
46 task. In this task, the participants held a ball in one hand and were asked to indicate by button 
47 
48 
pressing with the other hand when it would hit the ground if they were to release the ball. The 
50 
51 former  group reported  longer times relative to  the latter,  confirming that  the former  group 
52 
53 
took possession of a virtual body above them while the latter took possession of a virtual 
54 
55 
56 body below them. 
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The fMRI results revealed that activation in the temporal-parietal junction (TPJ) in the 
1 
2 two  hemispheres  not  only  predicted  a  displacement  in  bodily  self  but  also  whether this 
3 
4 
5 displacement  went  upwards  towards  a  virtual  body above  the  participants  or downwards 
6 
7 towards  a  virtual  body  below  the  participants.  Therefore,  TPJ  not  only  fulfils  a  role in 
8 
9 
multisensory integration, but it also contributes to the nature of the actual experience of the 
11 
12 conscious self (i.e. the self being displaced upwards vs. downwards). The fMRI experiment 
13 
14 
was further complimented with a quantitative MRI lesion analysis on a cohort of out-of-body 
16 
17 experience patients. This analysis showed maximal overlap in the location of their lesions 
18 
19 
with the fMRI activation observed in the right TPJ in their typical sample, implying a  crucial 
20 
21 
22 role of this area in bodily self-consciousness and establishing a casual relationship between 
23 
24 this area and bodily self-consciousness. 
25 
26 
27 The involvement of TPJ in this bodily illusion has been further confirmed by a  recent 
28 
29 single-case study in which fMRI responses were measured in a woman who reported to be 
30 
31 
able to wilfully produce out-of-body-experiences (Smith & Messier, 2014). The participant 
33 
34 was  asked to  either perform her extra-corporeal  experience or  guided motor imagery  tasks 
35 
36 
(e.g. jumping jacks; finger movements). The experimenter gave her cues on when to start and 
37 
38 
39 stop the task. Findings revealed a network of brain areas associated with the reported extra- 
40 
41 corporeal experience that differed from those observed during motor imagery.    In particular, 
42 
43 
44 the left supplementary motor area, the  supramarginal  and  posterior  superior temporal  gyri, 
45 
46 which overlap with TPJ, the cerebellum as well as frontal areas were active during the out-of- 
47 
48 
body-experience. 
50 
51 
52 
53 
FMRI and body-swap illusions 
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56 
11 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
 
 
10 
15 
32 
49 
 
 
The above research relates to the conscious self being removed from the physical body.   One 
1 
2 can  take  this  even  further  and  have  the  conscious  self  experimentally  transferred  to   a 
3 
4 
5 completely different  body such  that  one  obtains  the  experience  of  inhabiting this body as 
6 
7 opposed to their own. In the body-swap illusion, as the name implies, a person consciously 
8 
9 
experiences ownership of another body. As first demonstrated by Petkova & Ehrsson  (2008), 
11 
12 this illusion can be induced by applying tactile stimulation on a person’s body while they 
13 
14 
watch simultaneously, by means of virtual reality, the same tactile stimulation applied to a 
16 
17 mannequin from the first person visual perspective of the mannequin (Fig. 3). The illusion  of 
18 
19 
a body swap is reported to be so powerful that significant skin conductive responses can be 
20 
21 
22 induced in participants by stabbing the mannequin with a knife (Petkova et al., 2011; Petkova 
23 
24 & Ehrsson, 2008). 
25 
26 
27 In their seminal paper, Petkova & Ehrsson (2008) noted the importance of three 
28 
29 conditions for creating their illusion. First, a continuous match between visual and tactile 
30 
31 
information is absolutely necessary. Without this, the illusion does not occur. Second, the 
33 
34 usage of a sufficiently humanoid body is also required. The body swap does not transfer to 
35 
36 
blocks and other inanimate objects that are not shaped like human bodies. Third, the adoption 
37 
38 
39 of a first person visual perspective of the other body is required. Based on their findings,  and 
40 
41 the importance of these three factors in creating the illusion, Petkova & Ehrsson (2008) 
42 
43 
44 proposed  that  bodily  self-consciousness  arises  from  the  brain’s  assumption  that    visual 
45 
46 information is received under an egocentric frame of reference relative to a point between the 
47 
48 
two eyes and that the body produces patterns of sensory signals from other modalities in  step 
50 
51 with this information.    If the former changes in such a way that the latter becomes congruent 
52 
53 
with the first-person visual perspective of a different body, such as a mannequin’s, then a 
54 
55 
56 body swap will occur. 
12 
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In  a  subsequent  study,  the  same  authors  investigated  their  illusion  using    fMRI 
1 
2 (Petkova et al., 2011). Specifically, the authors aimed to determine how neuronal populations 
3 
4 
5 that integrate multisensory information across different body segments might merge  together 
6 
7 to form a single experience of bodily self. The illusion was controlled by having   participants 
8 
9 
observe tactile stimulation on the body of a mannequin from the mannequin’s first-person 
11 
12 view point while identical synchronous touches were applied to both the participant and 
13 
14 
mannequin. In doing this, the participants experienced a body swap illusion    coinciding with 
16 
17 fMRI activation in a network of brain regions, including bilateral ventral premotor (PMv), the 
18 
19 
left intraparietal sulcus, and the left putamen. 
20 
21 
22 Conditions  were  also  created  in  which  the  participant  saw  different  parts  of the 
23 
24 mannequin  being  stroked  in  isolation  without  seeing  the  rest  of  the  mannequin’s body, 
25 
26 
27 effectively creating illusions of changes in body-part ownership much like the rubber-hand 
28 
29 illusion. Replicating earlier fMRI work on the rubber-hand illusion (Ehrsson et al., 2005; 
30 
31 
Ehrsson et al., 2004), Petkova et al. (2011) demonstrated how bilateral activation in PMv was 
33 
34 strongly associated with the ownership for specific body parts. However, using multi-voxel 
35 
36 
pattern analysis, a technique that examines data from individual voxels within a region of 
37 
38 
39 interest jointly in a multivariate analysis, the authors found that a specific set of neuronal 
40 
41 populations within PMv in the two hemispheres could code for the ownership of a full body 
42 
43 
44 as opposed to a different body part like the hand or the abdomen. In other words, activation 
45 
46 for PMv can reflect a genuine full-body ownership representation, which will not be  invoked 
47 
48 
when the transfer of ownership is restricted to just one body part, such as the rubber-hand 
50 
51 illusion.   Such   specificity   during   illusory   conditions   cannot   be   explained   easily  by 
52 
53 
epiphenomena, underscoring an important role of PMv in the bodily consciousness of self 
54 
55 
56 and  the  ownership  of  different  body  parts.  Taken  together,  these  fMRI  results   provide 
57 
58 compelling  evidence  that  the  conscious  self  is  produced  by  neural  populations  within a 
13 
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specialised network that integrate multisensory information across the different segments   of 
1 
2 the physical body. 
3 
4 
5 Electrophysiological studies in the macaque monkey have found bimodal neurons    in 
6 
7 both   PMv and the putamen that fire when the money either sees or feels by touch a stimulus 
8 
9 
being applied  to  a  specific body part  (Graziano  & Gross,  1993;  Graziano,  Yap,  & Gross, 
11 
12 1994). The receptive fields of these cells do not move with the eyes but with the body part 
13 
14 
and the strength of their response diminishes as a function of the distance from the body part. 
16 
17 Moreover, it has been demonstrated that somatosensory and visual inputs can be combined 
18 
19 
together in individual neurons in parietal area 5 to represent limb positioning (Graziano, 
20 
21 
22 1999; Graziano, Cooke, & Taylor, 2000). Importantly, these neurons can code for the felt 
23 
24 position  of  the  monkey’s  arm  while  it  is  covered  from  view  (Graziano,  1999)  and  are 
25 
26 
27 sensitive to the position of a realistic false arm but only when false and real arm are stroked 
28 
29 synchronously, much like in the rubber-hand illusion (Graziano et al., 2000). Therefore, the 
30 
31 
functional role of these bimodal neurons might be to provide representations of the body 
33 
34 configurations, which are fundamental for the visual control of actions. Given the   properties 
35 
36 
of these neurons, it is expected that one’s body scheme can be    extended so as to incorporate 
37 
38 
39 foreign objects, even the outer edges of a car (Graziano et al., 2000), and give rise to the 
40 
41 bodily illusions described in our paper. 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 Conclusions 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 This paper has considered the usefulness of fMRI in establishing causal relationships between 
52 
53 
bodily  self-consciousness  and  the  brain.  We  reviewed  seminal  fMRI  papers  on   bodily 
54 
55 
56 illusions,  arguing  that  that  these  types  of  illusions  are  created  from  a  perturbation     in 
57 
58 multisensory integration that would normally provide accurate conscious experiences of    the 
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bodily self. For illusions of self-location outside a physical body, bilateral TPJ has been 
1 
2 reported to be functionally engaged. The necessity of the right TPJ has further been validated 
3 
4 
5 in  an  MRI  lesion  analysis  in  patients  who  had  out-of-body  experiences.  For body-swap 
6 
7 illusions, bilateral  PMv has been reported to be  functionally engaged.  As demonstrated   by 
8 
9 
multi-voxel pattern analysis, activation within this area reflects specificity for different  kinds 
11 
12 of body-part illusions as well as specificity for a whole-body illusion. If one considers the 
13 
14 
implications  of these findings  with  regards to  advancing our understanding the    conscious 
16 
17 bodily  self,   we  contend   that  further  study  and  advances  in   fMRI  will  continue       to 
18 
19 
progressively unlock its mysteries. 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 Figure legends 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 differences in perturbation should a causal relationship exist. 
52 
53 
54 
55 
Fig.  2.  Experimentally inducing  out-of-body experiences.  A number of studies, such     as 
57 
58 those performed by Ehrsson (2007),          Lenggenhager et al. (2007), and Ionta et al. (2011), 
Fig. 1. Inferring causality with perturbation techniques and fMRI. Evaluations of causality 
can  be  achieved  to  some  degree  with  fMRI  through  experimental  manipulation     using 
perturbation   techniques.   This   figure   provides   some   examples.   A)   Any  correlational 
measurement, such as fMRI, by itself can never be used to imply causation. Activation may 
or may not be related to the stimulus. B) If one were to perturb the system and the   activation 
remains then one can infer the two are unrelated. If one were to perturb the system and the 
activation disappears then one can infer some causal relationship. C) The same logic for B) 
can be applied to investigate consciousness. D) Creating different states of consciousness 
through perturbation should lead to different levels of fMRI activation that correspond to  the 
15 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
 
 
10 
15 
32 
49 
54 
 
 
demonstrate how one can experimentally alter bodily self-consciousness to a location outside 
1 
2 of the physical body. The basic underlying principles are as follows. A) Virtual reality is used 
3 
4 
5 to show participants the filming of a body part being brushed (in this case, the back). B) In 
6 
7 the synchronous condition, when the filming is presented in real-time and the  somatosensory 
8 
9 
and visual information about the brush strokes are simultaneous, participants perceive their 
11 
12 self  moving  in  space  away  from  their  physical  body  (in  this  case,  forward).  C)  In the 
13 
14 
asynchronous condition, when a delay between the visual and the somatosensory information 
16 
17 is introduced, participants do not experience their self as being in a location different from 
18 
19 
their physical body. 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 Fig.  3.  Experimentally  inducing  body-swap  illusions.  A number of studies, such as those 
25 
26 
27 performed by Petkova & Ehrsson (2008) and Petkova et al. (2011), demonstrate how one  can 
28 
29 experimentally  alter  bodily  self-consciousness  to  a  different  physical  body.  The     basic 
30 
31 
underlying  principles  are  as  follows.  A)  Virtual  reality  is  used  to  show  participants the 
33 
34 filming of a mannequin  being brushed while they are also  being brushed  (in this  case,    the 
35 
36 
belly is being brushed). B) In the synchronous condition, when the filming is presented in 
37 
38 
39 real-time  and  the  somatosensory  and  visual  information  about  the  brush  strokes        are 
40 
41 simultaneous, participants perceive their self inside the mannequin’s body as opposed to their 
42 
43 
44 own.  C)  In  the  asynchronous  condition,  when  a  delay  between  the  visual  and  the 
45 
46 somatosensory information is introduced, participants experience their self inside their own 
47 
48 
body as opposed to the mannequin’s. 
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